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How Is the Premium Calibrated for the Speculative Risk in Lodging Firms?
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ABSTRACT

The overarching themes of our paper are to calibrate the risk premium relative to the speculative risk
parameters in capital markets and to analyze the pre-and post-recession patterns in the U.S. lodging portfolios from 2000 to 2016. We decompose several risk parameters speculated by the markets
and risk-adjusted proxies to make solid judgments about the anomalies in excess return patterns
and risk-reward trade-off calibration in our annualized heterogeneous portfolio sorts. Our primary
findings reveal that our portfolio sorts did not return the efficient premium to the investors, as they
should have been based on the speculative risk levels before the recession. However, after the recession, there was a correction in this pattern. Lastly, speculative risk-adjusted proxies and risk parameters generally co-move with the value-weighted benchmark.
Keywords: equity premium, lodging portfolio sorts, risk-adjusted excess return, speculative risk parameters

Introduction
Conventional performance efficiency measurement
was long based on a comparison of the total return
of a portfolio with those of an unmatched portfolio, created by disregarding the universal portfolio
of firms (benchmark/market portfolio). However, a
simple comparison of the total return of the created
portfolio with an unmatched portfolio may most
likely produce invalid results and estimations for the
speculative risk-reward assessment. Later on, due to
asymmetric information and market inefficiencies,
risk-reward estimations are improved with multivariate risk-adjusted performance efficiency proxies
when calibrating the premium tied to the speculative risk parameters. Investors become wiser and rely
heavily on analysts’ recommendations made by these
proxies to select among available investment funds
and/or to form efficient portfolios. The applications
and rules of thumbs of the risk-adjusted excess return
estimations are not only common but are often the
basis for real-life investment decisions. Rather than
mechanical algorithm estimations, advocates strictly

emphasize that restricting peers to the same industry in the cross section, as opposed to clustering all
firms in one portfolio, improves the accuracy in estimations due to the existence of comparable assets and
identical firms in a standardized manner (i.e., Kim
& Ritter, 1999; Gibson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback, 2000;
Yee, 2004). Also, Alford (1992) stated that errors in
asset return analysis decline if a set of comparable
firms are chosen from the same industry or, at least,
subcategory of a certain industry. Therefore, a more
nuanced understanding of how the premium is calibrated for the speculative risk parameters is critical as it draws a much more accurate risk-adjusted
reward evaluation for firms and investors.
This phenomenon is even more critical for firms
that have a unique history of volatile financial structure (i.e., high levels of capital expenditure, unstable earnings and free cash flow, and low liquidity
and reduced possibilities for risk diversification)
that adversely affects the risk premiums (Kizildag
& Ozdemir, 2017). Our interest has been piqued by
the aforementioned financial nature of the lodging
firms. Thus, we believe that measuring speculative
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risk-adjusted efficiency for those firms over time is
worthwhile. In our paper, we quantify three risk-
adjusted proxies, the Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio,
and Jensen’s Alpha (α), along with the five properties of the speculative risk parameters calibrated to
the systematic risk, total risk, and price volatility
movement. We define our proxies and parameters
consistently with the preceding analysis so that we
can obtain uniform estimations across the sampled firms in our lodging portfolios over the long
haul. Additionally, as an economy enters a recession, it definitely causes severe blips on firms’ excess
returns. Hence, we also aim to provide compelling
empirical evidence of risk premium structure and
economic significance on the pre-and post-effects
of the recent 2007–2009 recession. Consistent with
the evidence and assessments above, we attempt to
rationalize and demonstrate the current patterns of
speculative risk-adjusted premium calibration for
each of the annualized portfolio sorts to lay out persuasive and pervasive investing strategies within the
context of the lodging industry. Our study departs
from the existing literature because it exhibits the
unique effects of speculative risk parameters on
equity premiums, and thus, the risk-adjusted efficiency for capital-intensive lodging portfolios over
the long run. Within all the evidences, we contribute
to and complement the existing evidence by providing an extensive economic outlook and across-the-
board practical understanding in this manner.
Economic Foundations of Risk-Reward
Properties
In general, the ultimate and inevitable connection
and trade-off between risk and reward is fundamental to many theories (i.e., modern portfolio theory),
concepts (i.e., efficient market hypothesis), and building blocks (i.e., the higher the risk, higher the return)
of mainstream finance (Chou, Engle, & Kane, 1992).
The general assertion is that “. . . historically, equities that produce the highest return simultaneously
have the highest risk” (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2017).
Nevertheless, numerous studies, which have investigated this matter, still put forth inconclusive empirical evidence (Lee, Jiang, & Indro, 2002). This might
be due to many reasons; however, advocates’ specific attitudes for a stringent validity of the estimations are clear that the premium calibration against

critical risk parameters is best understood when a
single industry is analyzed (i.e., Asness, Frazini, &
Pedersen, 2012). Therefore, several empirical documentations on risk-adjusted measurement for the
excess returns especially tied to speculative markets
have been lightening the needs for future examinations, understandings, and explanations in different
research areas with a narrow focus, stance, and angle.
In today’s research, some authors have looked at
the lack of fully diversified portfolios as a source for
excess returns, as real-life investors often hold under-
diversified portfolios in which idiosyncratic risk cannot completely be eliminated (Goetzmann & Kumar,
2008; Levy, 1978). A study by Merton (1987), for
example, showed that there could be larger expected
returns than in fully diversified portfolios. Other
researchers considered investors’ sentiments as a
primary driver of the premium. Lee et al. (2002), for
instance, found that investors’ sentiments were positively correlated with excess returns, as sentiments
are considered systematic risks that are being priced
by the speculative markets. Excess return measurement with various risk parameters is pervasive and
coherent because it entails calculating unique effects
of risk on the premium in a related benchmark. Performance measurement that is unadjusted for risk is
not quite meaningful, and that is why there has been a
pursuit for indicators that measure risk-adjusted performance based on various risk components (Asness
et al., 2012). The Sharpe ratio is the most commonly
used proxy for adjusting total upside and downside risk (standard deviation σ) for both for the risk
premia (Muralidhar, 2002). Jensen’s Alpha had the
highest explanatory power in demonstrating the risk-
adjusted performance and return in relation to the
benchmark returns (Bodson, Cave, & Sougne, 2012).
Scholz and Wilkens (2005) reported that systematic
risk components (both levered and unlevered) may
offer a better assessment of “risk-fit analysis,” particularly if the firms’ capital expenditures are levered and
risky (i.e., lodging firms). So, it is inevitable to examine systematic risk for the portfolio excess return
optimization with various risk-adjusted proxies, such
as the Treynor Index. Moreover, the price volatility
movement measured by the structural differences
between annualized high and low closing prices in
a given year (hi/lo risk) has received some attention by the researchers as well (i.e., Fornell, Mithas,
Morgeson, & Kirshan, 2006).

		

Although most research in the hospitality industry does not present an extensive and comprehensive
line of understanding equity premium calibration
with the existence of the speculative risk, the current line of research has touched base with some of
the risk parameters while analyzing returns. Some
studies showed that lodging firms outperform other
subsectors of real estate (office retail, industrial, and
apartment) regarding the total return and they also
produced second-best risk-adjusted returns for the
period of 1992 to 2001 (Petersen, Singh, & Sheel 2003).
Accordingly, risk-
adjusted performance evaluation with the Sharpe ratio for the U.S. airline, hotel,
restaurant, and travel and leisure industries showed
underperformance of the equity portfolios resulting
in a poor investment consideration (Ming-Hsiang,
2012). Further, four risk-adjusted performance proxies (Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, Jensen’s Alpha,
and Appraisal ratio) were employed by Mao & Gu
(2007) to measure the premium efficiency of hotel/
motel, restaurant, and casino/gaming industries.
Their results indicated that the gaming/casino industry portfolio outperformed the hotel/motel industry
portfolio. Taken all together, a solid comprehensive
analysis, which relies on mechanical analysis with
comparable assets/firms in identical years for the long
run, is still needed, although there is some evidence
in the existing literature.
Data and Sampling Methods
Longitudinal equity data for each comparable firm
in each lodging portfolio sort was gathered from
Damadoran Online Data Source, which is compiled
from Morningstar, Bloomberg, and Capital IQ filings.1 Monthly financial and market data (i.e., risk-
free rate) for 16 years were gathered from CRSP/
COMPUSTAT files. The most straightforward analysis involves the risk-reward efficiency measurement
in equities in portfolio sorts against a broader market index that measures the value weighted average
price movements (i.e., Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996).
Thus, we picked Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite
Index (S&P 500 Composite) as a market benchmark
for our measurement and analyses. Our estimations
have been annualized so that we can produce economically significant outcomes for the risk-adjusted
1
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performance measures. Given the structure of the
archived data for the lodging industry, we split our
final sample into 16 portfolios for each year from
2000 to 2016. In order to construct both speculative risk parameters and risk-adjusted proxies for
excess return, financial and market data lagged by
a fiscal year for 2000. Since absolute closing prices
of stocks are adjusted for tax and dividends and
they have skewed distributions, those prices cannot be utilized for both estimation and comparison
purposes. To overcome this issue in our examinations, we quantified standardized values rather than
market values of the stocks. We eliminated all of the
observations that did not have a record of at least
five-year speculative risk metrics and equity prices
(both high and low bid and ask prices). Also, we
did not include other hospitality subsectors, such
as gaming or cruise lines, due to lack of data and
large gaps of missing data in firm records. Therefore, our final sample has a minor selection bias that
could be attributed to this selection factor. Further,
we have kept the outliers, which do not lie only on
one side of the distribution, so that our results can
be free of estimation bias. Lastly, comparable firms
in the portfolio sorts must have been listed in COMPUSTAT for at least two years prior to the particular estimation year to mitigate the backfilling and
survivorship biases (Fama & French, 1993). Taken
all together, this estimation process helped us accurately differentiate how big the equity premium is
for the speculative risk proxies and assess losing or
winning annual portfolios in our final sample.
Decomposition of the Speculative Risk
Parameters
In the current disposition and dynamics of capital
markets, advocates’ recommendations and assertions (i.e., Asness, Hood, & Huss, 2015) are not
heavily dependent upon quantifying excess return
metrics and analyzing its distributions without risk-
adjusted parameters when measuring risk-reward
efficiency. Convex and speculative risk parameters,
such as volatility in price movement between high
and low closing prices (hi/lo risk), communicate
with the investors better and more efficiently in the
essence of their risk-adjusted risk-reward yields. This

Dr. Aswath Damadoran’s archived data is available at: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/.
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is mainly because the premium for any equity is an
increasing and/or decreasing function of speculation in risky assets, and hence, an increasing and/or
decreasing function of both idiosyncratic and non-
idiosyncratic risk values. Further, nearly all of the
variation in premium assessment and equity performance is explained and dominated by the variation
in stocks’ risk exposures in equity markets (Asness
et al., 2012; Garleanu & Pedersen, 2011). Risk-
adjusted excess return decomposition is also critical
for diverse investment opportunities as it provides
a clear foundation of portfolio value creation with
various parameters and proxies that signal the true
market price of a share vis-à-vis its risk components.
To address our analysis with an economic accuracy
and an empirical relevancy, we documented various
proxies for the excess return based on speculative
risk parameters assessing the degrees of the investors’
exposure to risk-reward structure and the premium
calibrated for these speculative risk parameters in
lodging portfolio sorts over the long haul. The risk-
reward proxies and metrics we employed in our
analyses are defined in detail below.
Levered Beta (β_levered)

Levered beta is directly associated with the probability distribution of returns of a firm’s stock, such
as the second and third moments of the distribution
and the coefficient of correlation between the returns
from a single stock and/or all other available stocks in
the capital markets (Arditti, 1967). Beta coefficient (β)
better absorbs the roles of excess returns by providing
the quantifiable effect of systematic risk when combined with size (high minus low–HML) and book-to-
market equity (small minus big–SMB) factors (Fama
& French, 2002). Additionally, lodging firms’ capital
structure is highly sensitive to systematic risks due to
high volatility in cash flows yielding higher leverage
amounts (Kizildag, 2015; Kizildag & Ozdemir, 2017;
Andrew & Schmidgall, 1993). Therefore, we utilized
Fama and French’s three-factor model with a 36-
month rolling window to extract β_levered as follows:
Rit − Rf =
βit(Rmt − Rf) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit

(1)

where Rit − Rf is the premium for the return and βit is
the estimated levered beta for stock i at time t. Rmt − Rf

is the excess return on a market portfolio. SMB and
HML are the size and book-to-market-equity factors,
respectively. εit is the error term. The 30-day T-bill
rate was taken as a proxy for the risk-free rate (Rf).
Unlevered Beta (β_unlevered)

This risk proxy is unlevered by the market value
debt to equity ratio for the sector. Unlevering a beta
removes the financial effects from both operational
and financial leverage (debt). That is, it is the beta
coefficient of each firm without any debt when analyzing the equity performance in relation to the
overall market (Kiselakova, Horvathova, Sofrankova, & Soltes, 2015; Damadoran, n.d.). Hence, the
β_unlevered is quantified as indicated below:
β_unleveredit = β_leveredit /
[(1 + (1 -T)*(Debt/Equity Ratioit)]

(2)

where T is the corporate tax rate. Debt defined as
including short-term and long-term debt, excluding
accounts payable and/or non-interest bearing liabilities, and the book value of debt is used as a proxy for
market value of debt for β_unlevered estimations.
Unlevered Beta Corrected for Cash (β_unlevered’)

As corrected for cash holdings, this unlevered beta
measure reflects both each firm’s operating assets
and cash holdings. Since the latter should have a
beta close to zero, we estimated this beta coefficient
of just the operating assets by using two numbers:
the unlevered beta and the cash as a percent of overall firm value in market terms in our portfolio sorts
(Damadoran, n.d.).
β_unleveredʹit = [β_unleveredit /
(1 -Cashit / Firm Valueit)]

(3)

where Cashit is the total value of cash and marketable
securities reported in a firm’s balance sheet. Firm Valueit is equal to Market Value of Equityit + Book Value of
Interest-bearing Debtit + PV of Lease Commitmentsit.
Hi/Lo Risk Coefficient (Annualized)

This is a risk parameter of price volatility adjusted
for the year based on daily price ranges. Hi/lo
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captures the maximum difference between any
equity transaction prices that were realized in a
given daily trading day. Hi/lo risk proxy is not only
very efficient and stringent but also robust to microstructure noise (deviation from stock’s fundamental value such as bid-ask bounce, the discreteness of
price change, etc.) when analyzing price adjusted for
risk. The coefficient will be zero, if the equity price
is constant (Sassan, Brandt, & Diebold, 2002; Damadoran, n.d.). Therefore, consistent with these prior
studies, hi/lo is simply computed as:
Hi/Lo =
[(52wk High Price –52wk Low Price)*2] /
(52wk High Price + 52wk Low Price)
(4)
where wk is the week.
Standard Deviation of Equity (σ_equity)

Besides levered and unlevered idiosyncratic risk
components of equities, we also investigated total
risk undertaken by all the stocks in our yearly
portfolio sorts to scrutinize both the volatility sensitivity of our portfolio sorts’ performance in relation to the market as a whole and the total risk
inherent to individual equity prices in each portfolio sort. This allowed us to observe and deliver a
sustainable analysis and a clear framework of the
premium sensitivity for the aggregate (total) speculative risk exposures, as Sullivan, Hutchingson, and
O’Connell (2009) and Fornell, Morgeson, and Hult
(2016) reported this conclusion in their papers as
well. Also, Petersen (2009) stated that analysts and
advocates frequently base their premium judgments on a combination of idiosyncratic and non-
idiosyncratic risk constructs. σ_equity is derived as
follows:
(5)
where Standard Deviation of Equity is the squared
root of each equity’s ( j) total squared distance from
n
the mean (Σj=1
(rj – r̄)2) multiplied by the probability
of occurrence of the jth equity in each portfolio sorts
a given year (n).
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Measurement of the Equity Premium
Most of the empirical approaches compute premium
metrics based on longitudinal historic data and are
mostly justified on the basis of predicted relationships with accounting items on the books (i.e., conventional indicators such as return on assets –ROA,
Tobin’s Q, etc.). Those accounting-
based proxies
ignore the ex-post excess return that firms receive
for exposing themselves to the extra volatility and
risk that are speculated and emerge by holding risky
assets in risky markets (i.e., Katchova & Enlow,
2013; Sorensen & Jagannathan, 2015). However,
when compared to the conventional proxies, risk-
calibrated measurements make adjustments to the
excess returns in order to take account of the differences in various speculative risk levels between the
portfolio returns and the benchmark returns. Specifically, the risk-adjusted and market-based proxies
diversify the risk estimations across the versatility
of portfolio and index return distributions with an
absolute decomposition and performance of excess
returns (Modigliani & Modigliani, 1997). As a result
of these, we picked the most notable risk-adjusted
and market-based proxies to measure the premium
levels calibrated by the fluctuating degrees of speculative risk parameters.
Treynor Index

The Treynor Index is critical and effective when
measuring the excess return in relation to market risk factor without leveraging the return of the
equity as Jensen’s Alpha estimation does. Thus, it is
empirically worthwhile and necessary to assess the
index coefficients in combination with the estimations of the two other risk-adjusted proxies (Sharpe
ratio and Jensen’s Alpha) to infer solid economic
significance of the outcomes (Treynor, 1965; Eling &
Schuhmacher, 2007). This index computes the risk
premium as in the Sharpe ratio. However, the major
difference between the Treynor Index and the Sharpe
ratio is that the premium in this index is computed
per unit of systematic risk (β) instead of the total
upside and downside risk (σ) of the portfolio as the
estimation considers a non-diversifiable portion of
the total risk, which cannot be eliminated through
diversification. We quantified the Treynor Index as
follows:
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Thus,
		(6)
Reduced to,

		(7)
Derived as,
(8)
where Treynor Indexit is the co-product П of firms’
annualized stock returns rit with geometric means
GMit, number of periods per year p, and number of
years n minus the co-product П of 30-day T-bill (rf ),
number of periods per year p, and number of years n
over in parenthesis, covariance of market and firms’
annualized stock returns ρi,m σm over standard deviation of annualized benchmark returns σm, which
estimates the beta (βit).
Sharpe Ratio

Pioneered by Sharpe (1966), the Sharpe ratio relies
on the first two moments of the asymmetric return
distributions as the expected value and the standard
deviation (σ). This ratio takes into account the correlation between the benchmark and the respective equity (Sharma, 2004; Brooks & Kat, 2002).
The Sharpe ratio computes the risk premium of the
selected portfolio per unit of total risk of that portfolio by capturing the reward (premium) for investing in a risky portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate
of interest and variability of returns of the selected
portfolio. Based on the properties of the Sharpe
ratio, we derived this proxy as follows:

		(9)
Simplifying equation (9) into,
(10)

(11)
where Sharpe Ratioit is the co-product П of firms’
annualized stock returns rit with geometric means
GMit, number of periods per year p, and number of
years n minus the co-product П of 30-day T-bill (rf ),
number of periods per year p, and number of years n
over under square root variance varit of firms’ annualized stock returns rit with geometric means GMit
and annualized benchmark return rm, which estimates the standard deviation (σit).
Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen’s α)

Jensen’s Alpha, the intercept in a regression, is
another proxy in providing the absolute excess
return obtained when deviating from the benchmark. Along with the other two metrics assessing the
premium, Jensen’s Alpha represents the part of the
mean return of the equity that cannot be explained
by the systematic risk exposure (i.e., β_levered) to
benchmark variations. Thus, α is given by the annualized return of the equity, deducted the yield of an
investment without risk, and minus the return of
the benchmark multiplied by the stock’s β given a
particular year (Jensen, 1968). The linear formula to
extract α coefficient is as follows:
(12)
where Jensen’s Alphait ( ) is the annualized geometric return of firms’ annualized stock returns rit
minus 30-day T-bill (rf ), plus firms’ annualized beta
βit multiplied by the market risk premium (rm –rf ).
Empirical Results and Findings
There were not extensive fluctuations in the mean
and median values for both speculative risk parameters and the risk-adjusted equity premium measures.
Thus, the pattern in descriptive values demonstrated
that the premium estimations based on risk derivations are highly aligned with each other. For instance,
hi/lo risk proxy had the lowest mean and median
value (x̄ = 0.45 and x̃ = 0.42), whereas σ_equity fluctuated within the upper bound of 62.02% and the

		

lower bound of 25.71% with the highest mean and
median values (x̄ = 43.39% and x̃ = 46.07%) in our
final sample of 56 lodging firms with 1,259 firm
observations. Additionally, risk-adjusted premium
measures signaled consistencies with the underlying
risk parameters since the same pattern of descriptive values holds validity for these proxies as well.
For example, upper and lower bound distribution
of Sharpe ratio was between 1.121 and –0.922 with
x̄ = 0.525 and x̃ = 0.842 in the aggregate portfolio sorts. Table 1 provides the characteristics and
descriptive values of the portfolio sorts along with
the sample size for each year in detail.
To draw more meaningful estimations in our multi-
proxy analyses and derivation, we report annualized
risk parameter estimates along with the risk-adjusted
premium measures for both our equity lodging portfolios and the value weighted aggregate benchmark,
S&P 500 Composite from 2000 to 2016 in Table 2.
One striking result in this paper is that the annualized
premiums are not as efficient as they should have been
when lodging portfolios are adjusted to both levered
and unlevered per unit of systematic risk between
2000 and 2004. We observed the same patterns when
we analyzed the annualized, mean excess returns
earned by lodging portfolios in excess of the risk-free
rate per unit of total risk. Parallel to this, equity premium performance was not superior when deviating
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from the benchmark returns in this period. Portfolios’
Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s Alpha were
low in 2002 (0.342, 0.003, and 0.023 respectively) but
they bore higher degrees of non-diversifiable risk
(β_levered: 0.90 and β_unlevered: 0.56), even when
they were corrected for cash (β_unleveredʹ: 0.58).
However, the movement in price volatility (hi/lo: 0.22)
and the total risk distribution both upside as well as
downside was narrower (σ_equity: 25.71%). Lodging
portfolios only performed well, provided higher risk-
adjusted proxies, and had better premiums overall
in 2004 in this period (Treynor Index: 0.842, Sharpe
ratio: 0.059, and Jensen’s α: 0.031). One explanation
might be that equities were possibly exposed to low
or inconsistent growth in earnings (i.e., diluted per
share earnings). Also, equity prices are possibly subject to market speculations causing undervaluation,
and thus, poor risk-adjusted excess returns for the
investors although they co-move with the aggregate
market (Treynor Indexm: 0.581, Sharpe ratiom: 0.022,
and Jensen’s αm: 0.061).
Annualized estimations from 2005 to 2007 gave
us enough clues about the meltdown in prices as
well as drastically minimal excess returns. Therefore, before drawing conclusions about the aftermath of the recession, we also checked how big the
risk and premium differences were in our lodging
portfolio sorts before and after the recent economic

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the annualized summary of fundamental descriptive values for both speculative risk parameters and risk-
adjusted excess return measures along with the associated total number of lodging firms for the aggregate portfolio sorts
from 2000 to 2016. Annualized aggregate market (S&P 500 Composite) descriptive values are not included.
Min.

Max.

Mean

Obs.

0.74

1.75

0.50

1.24

0.52

1.35

0.22

0.75

25.71%

62.02%

1.18
(0.97)
0.78
(0.66)
0.82
(0.69)
0.45
(0.42)
43.39%
(46.07%)

N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56

Treynor Index

−0.019

1.121

Sharpe Ratio

0.001

0.135

−0.083

0.075

0.038
(0.059)
0.525
(0.842)
0.020
(0.033)

N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56
N=1,259
n=56

Speculative Risk Proxies
Levered Beta
(β_levered)
Unlevered Beta (β_unlevered)
Unlevered Beta Corrected for Cash
(β_unlevered’)
Hi/Lo Risk Coefficient
(Annualized)
Standard Deviation of Equity (σ_equity)
Risk-Adjusted Premium Measures

Jensen’s Alpha (α)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are the median figures for the corresponding proxies and measures.
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crisis, lasting roughly 2.5 years in the 2007–2009
period. Figures 1 and 2 report the results and patterns in detail. Our chief understanding was that
when the global economy started to slow down
during the years preceding the recession, the net
effect of the crisis was severe on lodging firms
because their vulnerability to the risk speculated in
markets worsened their financial gains. That is, the
premium was not equally calibrated for the speculative risk generated in the benchmarks. Although the
speculative risk parameters scored high (β_levered:
0.88, β_unlevered: 0.61, β_unleveredʹ: 0.63, hi/
lo risk: 0.44, and σ_equity: 45.00% in the 7-year
pre-crisis moving average), lodging portfolios did
not achieve higher premiums per unit of risk they
bear, (Treynor Index: −0.04, Sharpe ratio: 0.002,
and Jensen’s α: −0.01 in the 7-year pre-crisis moving
average). This pattern was an indicator of a drastic
volatility and tumble in equity prices along with
the great level of uncertainty, and hence, the inevitable recession. In the heat of the downturn at the
Pre-Crisis 7-year moving avg.:
β_levered: 0.88
β_unlevered: 0.61
β_unlevered’: 0.63
Hi/Lo Risk: 0.44
σ_equity: 0.45

beginning of 2008, lodging portfolio sorts’ excess
returns drastically degraded to the lowest levels. For
instance, the Treynor Index was around −0.80 score
range, indicating that lodging firms’ net earnings
and liquidity conditions from the excess returns
were not strong enough to offset their residual risk
levels. During the post-upheaval period, credit creation of aggregate long-term loans and eased lending procedures enabled lodging firms to relax their
borrowing capacity rapidly and grow their leverage ratios aggressively (Altin, Kizildag, & Ozdemir,
2016; Kizildag & Ozdemir, 2017). Thus, the bounce
back from a recent crisis gave those firms solid
opportunities to reap higher rewards with associated
higher risk levels. This pattern has been long drawn
out until the current day. Financial and economic
relief in the macro-and micro-environment economy as well as the recovery in firms’ earnings, cash
flows, leverage, and liquidity in the markets were the
main reasons why portfolio sorts’ premium levels
skyrocketed. The post-crisis 7-year moving averages
Post-Crisis 7-year moving avg.:
β_levered: 1.50
β_unlevered: 0.97
β_unlevered’: 1.03
Hi/Lo Risk: 0.47
σ_equity: 0.43

2.00

β_levered
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Figure 1. Speculative Risk Comparison Plot between Pre- and Post-2008 Economic Crisis
The pre-2008 period corresponds to fiscal years between 2001 and 2008. Post-2008 era includes fiscal years of 2009 to 2016
for an equal 7-year comparison. Vertical dashed lines demonstrate where the equity prices started to free fall.

		

The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management

Pre-Crisis 7-year moving avg.:
Treynor Index: -0.04
Sharpe Ratio: -0.02
Jensen’s α: -0.01
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Post-Crisis 7-year moving avg.:
Treynor Index: 1.08
Sharpe Ratio: 0.10
Jensen’s α: 0.05
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Figure 2. Risk-Adjusted Proxy Comparison Plot between Pre- and Post-2008 Economic Crisis
The pre-2008 period corresponds to fiscal years between 2001 and 2008. Post-2008 era includes fiscal years of 2009 to 2016
for an equal 7-year comparison. Vertical dashed lines demonstrate where the equity prices started to free fall.

for Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s α were
1.08, 0.10, and 0.05, respectively, yielding high premiums for the investors. As it can clearly be inferred
from the first figure, the positive sentiment and confidence (both individual and institutional) on Wall
Street raised risk levels parallel to the excess return
generated in capital markets in the aftermath of the
upheaval. β_levered was 1.50 and hi/lo risk parameter was 0.47 when post-crisis 7-year moving averages
were analyzed. Investment fear dip enabled lodging
firms to capitalize on capital investments and +Net
Present Value (+NPV) projects. Bottom line, lodging firms entered an unprecedented “excess return
era” after 2008.
In the aftermath of the recession, investors’ bullish sentiment bumped share prices, and thus, overall firm values in benchmarks yielded high excess
returns. Based on the Treynor Index estimation,
1.119 units of excess return were generated per unit
of levered and unlevered systematic risk. This scenario was the same for the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s
α as well. These measures scored the highest levels at
0.135 and 0.075, respectively, in 2010 along with the
high levels of speculative risk parameters, which are

very natural to observe (β_levered: 1.74, β_unlevered:
1.00, β_unleveredʹ: 1.06, hi/lo risk: 0.42, and σ_equity:
46.07%). This means that for every point of return,
investors are shouldering 0.135 units of total upside and
downside risk given the expected return in the benchmark. Our estimations signal and imply that investors
not only gain competitive positioning in “good” investments and excess returns but also earn higher solid
income generated from the relaxed market conditions
and macro-and micro-investment practices. Our findings and results also tell us that there is a fair trade-
off between speculative risk parameter values and the
risk-adjusted premium measures, which demonstrates
that obtained estimations are reasonable given the
estimation patterns. For the short-term predictions,
these results support expected momentum investing,
forward-looking investment potential, and sustainable
financial productivity in the lodging industry.
Concluding Remarks, Implications, and Future
Directions
The standard and very practical advice provided by
the advocates and analysts is that risk identification
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Table 2. Annualized Estimations for the Excess Return and Speculative Risk Exposure
This table reports the annualized estimations of the speculative risk parameters and the risk-adjusted performance proxies
quantified for assessing the risk premium. Estimations are presented as an integer for both Equity Portfolio Sorts and the
Aggregate Market Value Weighted Benchmark (S&P 500) in Parts A and Part B respectively.
Part A: Annualized Estimations of the Equity Portfolio Sorts
Speculative Risk Parameters

Risk Premium Proxies

Years

β_levered

β_unlevered

β_unlevered’

Hi/Lo Risk

σ_equity

Treynor
Index

Sharpe
Ratio

Jensen’s α

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.93
0.84
0.90
0.91
0.84
0.74
0.82
0.77
1.25
1.70
1.74
1.75
1.74
1.65
1.27
1.18
0.97

0.66
0.53
0.56
0.50
0.54
0.54
0.63
0.60
0.96
0.78
1.00
1.24
1.20
1.21
0.87
0.80
0.65

0.69
0.55
0.58
0.52
0.56
0.56
0.66
0.62
0.98
0.84
1.06
1.35
1.28
1.29
0.90
0.83
0.68

0.33
0.36
0.22
0.39
0.34
0.40
0.36
0.75
0.70
0.55
0.42
0.40
0.50
0.56
0.44
0.45
0.42

30.12%
47.82%
25.71%
36.15%
51.60%
34.55%
46.75%
62.02%
55.06%
37.84%
46.07%
41.58%
47.82%
41.71%
36.49%
49.55%
46.75%

0.566
0.438
0.342
0.416
0.842
−0.019
−0.634
−0.767
−0.922
1.037
1.119
1.061
1.121
1.088
1.113
1.078
1.054

0.026
0.012
0.033
0.034
0.059
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.007
0.092
0.135
0.088
0.107
0.083
0.091
0.079
0.085

0.057
0.038
0.023
−0.019
0.031
−0.028
−0.046
−0.083
−0.021
0.059
0.075
0.049
0.066
0.046
0.033
0.029
0.037

Part B: Annualized Estimations of the Aggregate Market Value Weighted Benchmark (S&P500)
Speculative Risk Parameters

Risk Premium Proxies

Years

β_leveredm

β_unleveredm

β_unlevered’m

Hi/Lo Riskm

σ_equitym

Treynor
Indexm

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.86
0.87
0.89
0.99
0.91
1.00
1.15
1.14
1.26
1.19
1.17
1.15
1.13
1.17
1.01
1.06
0.13

0.70
0.72
0.73
0.72
0.68
0.81
0.89
0.90
0.98
0.77
0.82
0.80
0.83
0.87
0.60
0.67
0.61

0.75
0.73
0.78
0.81
0.72
0.87
0.97
0.89
1.05
0.86
0.90
0.93
0.82
0.96
0.64
0.70
0.77

0.35
0.36
0.28
0.41
0.42
0.46
0.69
0.60
0.49
0.38
0.45
0.44
0.31
0.43
0.47
0.46
0.44

38.16%
34.55%
36.17%
40.88%
41.58%
46.75%
47.82%
68.90%
59.06%
57.84%
51.60%
46.75%
49.87%
50.66%
52.34%
53.60%
51.65%

0.581
0.445
0.362
0.403
0.881
−0.032
−0.826
−0.912
−1.003
1.001
1.009
1.198
1.213
1.076
1.088
1.092
1.061

Sharpe
Ratiom

Jensen’s αm

0.022
0.018
0.041
0.029
0.061
0.004
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.090
0.186
0.091
0.111
0.085
0.088
0.074
0.081

0.061
0.030
0.017
−0.022
0.028
−0.037
−0.041
−0.080
−0.019
0.055
0.073
0.051
0.055
0.039
0.031
0.027
0.034

Note: Risk parameters and the risk premium proxies are in monthly values that are adjusted to annual values. To annualize any monthly
estimation in our data analyses, we employed an economic derivation as:

where Xm and Xm-1 are the values of the

parameters in months m and m-1, respectively, and gm is the annualized percent change. Estimations for the aggregate benchmark are
signified by m in Part B.

in every type of financial investment is not a one-
faced phenomenon. It is the dynamic practice that
is assessed and re-
assessed periodically and continuously according to the investment objective(s)
because no economic and/or financial factors can
fully predict the likelihood of financial occurrence
and outcome in asymmetric markets (i.e., Barreda

& Kizildag, 2015). Tangled findings in previous
research have not shown a solid consensus about
how the premium is calibrated for the various
speculative risk parameters over time (i.e., Eling &
Schuhmacher, 2007). Therefore, our paper aimed to
develop an extensive understanding of how a variety
of risk factors relative to market speculation shape the

		

changing behavior of excess return effectiveness and
performance in our portfolio sorts at various time
frames for investors in the capital-intensive lodging
industry. During the years preceding the 2007–2009
recession, lodging portfolio sorts interestingly did not
provide higher levels of excess returns in exchange
for the relative speculative risks (i.e., levered market
risk) although lodging firms bear high levels of risk
(i.e., total upside and downside risk) and high levels
of price volatility. We interpreted this stagnancy in
equity trades, stock prices, and investments as investors’ potential recessional sentiment. Shortly after,
our portfolio sorts experienced a great level of negative price disturbances and a downturn in macro-and
micro-structure, and hence, the economic recession
that negative risk-adjusted returns caused a very dry
environment on Wall Street in terms of liquidity in
equity exchange, trade, and investments. When the
economy was in a “boom” state, investors’ confidence
had re-achieved enabling lodging firms to recover
from losses in markets and to have high productivity
and output growth. The re-established positivity and
information efficiency also enabled investors to “correctly” price the value of liquid assets in benchmarks.
As a result of these, asset supply in markets and investors’ demand created a new equilibrium in equity
prices that risk-reward trade-off was balanced with
the highest excess returns and maintained this bullish
pattern until the present time.
Our results and findings are closely relevant to
industry professionals and practitioners, such as the
management of the lodging firms, fund or money
managers supplying funds to these firms for investment purposes, and lodging industry consultants,
who utilize speculative risk-adjusted proxies to measure the excess returns, as well as to related academic
researchers. The choice of risk-adjusted proxies does
not have a crucial influence on the relative evaluation of how big the premium is for the speculative
risk exposure in lodging portfolio sorts. In other
words, the selection process for portfolio formation and diversification varies. Practitioners’ and/or
investors’ points of view and investment objectives
and risk-
aversion levels become essential in such
cases. For instance, any particular portfolio formation might give more weight to systematic risk or
total risk adjusted estimations for the excess return
assessment. Therefore, considering investors’ diverse
utility maximization strategies and levels, it is best for
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practitioners to identify comparable assets with identical firms for any selected target firms or portfolios or
peer industry standards with various risk and reward
parameters and measures. Our analyses, results, and
findings provide informed knowledge about different
speculative risk-adjusted excess return calibration and
patterns as well as shed a light on various decision-
making strategies and momentum in investing and
portfolio formation within the lodging industry.
The use of the results and findings of our paper is
generalizable to a comprehensive population of U.S.
lodging firms; however, as in any other study, our
paper is not free of limitations and has some minor
exclusions. Our estimations for the calibration of the
equity premium against speculative risk exposure
can be extended by including additional parameters
and proxies such as the sortino ratio, upside potential ratio, excess return on value at risk, etc. Moreover, a worthwhile extension might pay attention to
factor-analytic techniques, such as path analysis or
causal models that mitigate presumptive measurement issues encountered when working with factors
affecting speculative risk parameters and premium
measurement such as financial leverage (i.e., total
debt-
to-
equity ratio). Additionally, analyses concentrating upon the likelihood of financial distress
and bankruptcy/default-risk along with the lodging portfolio aggregate risk levels can also move the
related research forward.
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